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THE IRRESOLUTION OF ROME
RUTH WEDGWOOD*
I
INTRODUCTION—THE U.S. SIGNATURE AND ITS AFTERMATH
President Clinton’s signature of the Rome treaty in the twilight of his Ad-
ministration has punctuated the long impasse over American participation in
the International Criminal Court (the “ICC”).1  Signing on December 31, 2000
(the last day possible for a signature without ratification), the President pro-
claimed his “strong support for international accountability” and for “bringing
to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”2
A “properly constituted and structured” criminal court, said the President,
could “make a profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights
abuses worldwide.”3
The signing was unusual, for the President foreswore any intention of rati-
fying the treaty in the foreseeable future.  He would not send the treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent, nor recommend that his successor do so, until
and unless “fundamental concerns” could be resolved.  The United States pre-
ferred to “observe and assess the functioning of the Court, over time,” said the
President, adverting to the need to “protect U.S. officials from unfounded
charges.”  This is a legal realist’s vantage—a jurisdictional statute, the elements
of crimes, and the specification of procedures do not suffice to show how a
court will operate, what the culture of a prosecutor’s office will be, or how a
court will read its mission.   Watching the court in action is a far more rigorous
test.
But why sign at all, if ratification is purely hypothetical?  With signature,
said the President, the United States could better “influence the evolution of
the Court,” and, in particular, address the court’s misplaced temptation to as-
sert third-party jurisdiction “over personnel of states that have not” ratified.
This, of course, was not an independent reason to eschew ratification.  If a
country is willing to accept direct responsibility for its nationals’ actions (as a
treaty party), it has no occasion to worry that there may be an alternative ave-
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1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, Dec. 31, 2000, 37(1)
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 4 (2001).
3. Id.
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nue of liability. But the literary grace of the President’s signing statement is not
the point. Rather, the emphasis on third-party liability is a measure of U.S.
anxiety that the court might ultimately choose to criminalize good faith debates
in military doctrine.  When and how to use force is hardly a settled matter in
foreign policy or even in the law.  The ICC is asked to interpret and apply
norms that are not bright-line rules, including questions such as proportionality,
and the nature of a military versus civilian target.  These are hotly debated
among responsible militaries, and must in practice be informed by military ex-
pertise and battlefield alternatives, as well as by political and ethical judgment.
The United States has understandably feared that good faith operational ques-
tions could be precipitously removed from their usual place of debate in alli-
ance headquarters and military manuals, and be recast in a courtroom’s crimi-
nal rhetoric.  Should one disable dual use electrical systems that support anti-
aircraft as well as hospitals?  Does an adversary’s perfidy in misusing civilian
sites to launch attacks then change the eligibility of those sites as targets?  The
standards for war-fighting are often more akin to open-textured principles,
rather than self-executing rules—depending on acute judgments of facts and al-
ternatives, in a fluid situation where lives are at stake and one hardly has time
to “make a record” for litigation later.  It is not surprising that the review of all
battlefield decisions by civilians without military experience might worry a pro-
fessional military operator, at least in countries where the military actually de-
ploys on duty in combat missions.
The President’s treaty signature may advance the international debate over
the American request for a fair chance to watch the court in action.  A unilat-
eral diplomatic gesture can be risky, since there is no guarantee of reciprocity.
But compromise in the ongoing Preparatory Commission (“PrepCom”) nego-
tiations4 to launch the court has been stymied until now by the occasionally ob-
durate attitude of court absolutists, and as well by the concern that no one could
tell whether any particular concession would actually induce U.S. signature to
the ICC treaty.  This made it especially hard to persuade major nations to meet
U.S. concerns.  With the unilateral gesture, the U.S. has  placed its bet on grace
and reciprocity—hoping that its concern about third-party liability will be seen
as a reasonable position whose resolution will strengthen the court with Ameri-
can economic, diplomatic, and military assets.
Interestingly, the “concerns” framed in President Clinton’s signing state-
ment were not filed with the treaty depository as formal conditions, under-
standings, or reservations to the signing.  The Rome treaty text forbids reserva-
tions,5 and U.N. lawyers have rejected at least one attempt to deposit a
4. The Preparatory Commission was established by a resolution of the Rome conference.  See Fi-
nal Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an In-
ternational Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/10*, Annex I, Res. F (July 17, 1998)(conference
resolution calling for PrepCom); see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112(2)(a) (“The Assembly [of
States Parties] shall: (a) Consider and adopt, as appropriate, recommendations of the Preparatory
Commission.”).
5. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 120.
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signature with provisos resembling reservations.  Yet a number of Rome signa-
tories have indulged themselves with “interpretive declarations” filed with the
depository upon ratification (including the French with seven and the Norwe-
gians with three).   The United States did not hedge its bets even to that degree.
Certainly some tolerance for clarifying “declarations” may behoove a treaty
process such as the ICC, for the final Rome text was finished in haste at the
five-week diplomatic conference in 1998 and corrigenda and corrections have
continued to be issued by the United Nations even two years after the treaty
text was voted.6
To be sure, through signature, the United States has done more than poten-
tially enhance its fund of good will.  The United States also has subjected itself
to certain international legal duties of good faith in not frustrating the ICC’s
object and purpose.7  The articulate acknowledgement of this duty by the
American Secretary of State at the outset of the new Republican Administra-
tion in the setting of a skeptical Senate hearing may serve to give America’s in-
terlocutors a warmer appreciation that the court may benefit from a broad
range of arms-length support in its work.  The newly appointed Secretary of
State-designate, General Colin L. Powell, appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January 18, 2001, for his confirmation hearing, shortly
after the treaty signature by the outgoing President.  In a broad survey of his
views on foreign policy, General Powell advised chairman Helms that he had
reservations about the ICC treaty, and that no one should be “standing on . . .
tippy-toes waiting for the Bush administration to ask for any movement toward
ratification of the treaty.”8 But in the same breath, General Powell stated that
“when you do sign a treaty, in legal terms you sort of bind yourself to the pur-
6. See Procès-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the Statute, Nov. 10, 1998 (11 proposed
corrections to statute text communicated to interested states by depository notification on Sept. 25,
1998, C.N. 502.1998.TREATIES-3, and adopted without objection, C.N.577.1998.TREATIES-8); Pro-
cès-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the Statute, July 12, 1999 (22 proposed corrections to
statute text communicated to interested states by depositary notifications on May 19, 1999, and July 1,
1999, C.N.357.1999.TREATIES-14, and C.N.537.1999.TREATIES.16, and adopted without objection,
C.N.577.1999.TREATIES); Procès-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the Statute, Nov. 30, 1999
(two proposed corrections to French text and five proposed corrections to Spanish text communicated
to interested states by depository notification on Oct. 15, 1999, C.N.781.1999-TREATIES-21, and
adopted without objection);  Procès-Verbal  of Rectification of the Original of the Statute, May 8, 2000
(18 proposed corrections to French text and 57 proposed corrections to Spanish text communicated to
interested states by depository notification on Mar. 24, 2000, C.N.177-2000.TREATIES-5, and adopted
without objection).
In addition, after the conclusion of the Rome negotiations and before the formal process of corri-
genda, the text of the Rome treaty was “reissued for technical reasons.” Compare Rome Statute,
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), with Rome Statute, A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998)(“[r]eissued for
technical reasons).  The initial Rome text had at least one crucial error, for the seven-year transition
provision insisted upon by France in Article 124—permitting an “opt-out” from war crimes jurisdic-
tion—referred in cross reference to Article 5 rather than Article 8.
7. See Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, at
289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969).  Although the Vienna Conven-
tion has not been ratified by the United States, it generally reflects the customary law of treaties.
8. Confirmation Hearing of General Colin L. Powell to be Secretary of State, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Jan. 17, 2001, available at <http://www.un.int/usa/01pow 117.htm>.
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pose and objectives of the treaty.”9  Noting his concerns about the consistency
of the treaty with expectations about constitutional rights in criminal trials,
Powell stated plainly that “[t]he new administration will be opposed to the In-
ternational Criminal Court.”10  But he again laid down a legal and political
bright line about the duty of good faith.  Addressing Senator George Allen of
Virginia, General Powell said, “Take note of the fact, though, that once Amer-
ica signs a treaty such as this, we are in some ways expected not to defeat its
purpose, intended purpose.  And the expectation is that we would ultimately
ratify it,” Powell went on, even though “I don’t think it likely you’ll see this ad-
ministration send it up for ratification.”11  In a world of diplomacy where strate-
gic ambiguity is a studied art, General Powell’s views were strikingly construc-
tive.  Since that time, in the context of a discussion of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher has noted the Secretary is committed to “international justice for in-
ternational crimes.”12
To be sure, Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, publicly complained, upon news of the signature by President
Clinton, that the action was a “blatant attempt by a lame-duck President to tie
the hands of his successor.”13  Senator Helms argued that in the two years of ne-
gotiations in the ICC Preparatory Commission, the potential problem of third-
party jurisdiction over American service personnel had not been solved.
“Nothing—I repeat, nothing—has changed since then to justify U.S. signature. .
. . This decision will not stand.”14
Shortly after the November presidential election, a group of former senior
U.S. foreign policy officials from both parties, including former Defense Secre-
tary Donald Rumsfeld, issued a letter also opposing any attempt to place
American service personnel or political leaders under the jurisdiction of the
ICC,15 and supporting the so-called American Servicemembers’ Protection Act.16




12. Statement of Richard Boucher, State Department Briefing, Jan. 24, 2001, available in Fed.
News Serv., Inc.
13. Press Release, United States Congress, Statement of Senator Jesse Helms (Dec. 31, 2000),
available  in eMediaMillWorks Inc. (formerly known as Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.).
14. Id.
15. See Letter of Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, Caspar Weinberger, Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski, R. James Woolsey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard V. Allen,
George Shultz, James A. Baker III, and Robert M. Gates, to House Majority Whip Congressman Tom
DeLay, Nov. 29, 2000, available at <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/2000/delay_letter.pdf>.
16. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, Senate Bill S2726, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 14, 2000) (“A Bill To protect United States military personnel
and other elected and appointed officials of the United States Government against criminal prosecution
by an international criminal court to which the United States is not a party.”).  Accord H.R. 4654,
House International Relations Committee, 106th Cong, 2d Sess. (June 14, 2000).
17. Memorandum of Marc Thiessen, Press Spokesman, Nov. 30, 2000, available at <http://www.
senate.gov/~foreign/press_template.cfm?rands_id=175489>.
WEDGWOOD_FINAL_FMT.DOC 05/14/01  8:42 AM
Page 193:  Winter 2001] IRRESOLUTION OF ROME 197
tional criminal prosecution” might “chill decision-making within our govern-
ment.” It could “limit the willingness of our national leadership to respond
forcefully to acts of terrorism [and] aggression,” said the former officials, noting
that the diplomatic efforts of the Clinton Administration had not resolved the
problem of third-party jurisdiction.  Though Mr. Rumsfeld was, of course,
shortly thereafter selected by President Bush to head the Defense Department
in the new administration, it is worth noting that the letter was followed by the
Secretary of State’s enunciation of the duty of good faith, and that even these
signatories anticipated further negotiation.18
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake on the part of Rome treaty supporters to
suppose that the issue of third-party jurisdiction is put to rest.  The American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which would forbid all cooperation with the
ICC, was tabled in mid-2000 after the Clinton Administration argued that it in-
fringed the constitutional powers of the Presidency under Article II.19  But con-
fidence that the United States will act as a quiet and friendly supporter of the
ICC in the period until it may entertain ratification depends on the successful
resolution of this needlessly nettlesome issue of third-party jurisdiction.
II
THE FAILED HISTORY OF COMPROMISE ON THIRD-PARTY JURISDICTION
In the attempt to advance constructive negotiations between the United
States and its allies on the International Criminal Court, it may be well to ana-
lyze the labor that has gone before in seeking a compromise on the crucial issue
of “third-party” jurisdiction.  The PrepCom has supplemented the treaty with
rules of procedure and evidence, as well as defining the elements of criminal of-
fenses.20  But the PrepCom is still at work, as of this writing, in crafting a so-
called “relationship agreement” between the Court and the United Nations,21 as
well as settling issues of financing.  The negotiators have long since become fa-
miliars in the endless rounds of informal consultations, jousting in predictable
ways on the terms that will govern proceedings under the treaty court.
18. Id. (“House passage of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act can only strengthen the
hand of U.S. negotiators as they seek to remedy the worst aspects of the treaty.”).
19. See Statement of Ambassador David Scheffer before the House International Relations Com-
mittee (July 26, 2000)(opposing the legislation as unconstitutional intrusion on authority of the Execu-
tive), available at <www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000726_scheffer_service.html>, and
Statement of Ruth Wedgwood before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 14, 2000 (copy on
file with author)(urging committee to delay action on the bill).
20. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum,
Finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2,
2000), and Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/ Add.2 (Nov. 2,
2000).
21. See Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/L.1 (Aug. 9, 2000).
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The many weeks of PrepComs since Rome, in six separate convocations,22
have not yet succeeded in overcoming the Achilles’ heel of the treaty:  the need
for some assurance concerning third-party jurisdiction.  In order to win the
United States as a constant supporter, and gain the advantage of American
diplomatic, military, and economic power to give teeth to the tribunals’ orders,
this issue must be resolved.23  Despite its recent signature of the treaty, the
United States will otherwise keep its distance from the court, out of fear that an
ICC prosecutor could become a self-propelled auditor of American military op-
erations.
The PrepCom discussions have brought some comforts to U.S. skeptics, for
example, by preserving a more realistic definition of “proportionality” in mili-
tary operations,24 and clarifying treaty language on “transfer” of populations in
a way designed to prevent the court’s politicization in the Middle East peace
process.25  Yet there was no apparent progress on the key issue blocking Wash-
ington’s support of the court.  The United States has insisted that the court
should function as a treaty organization founded on state consent, while re-
specting Security Council authority to refer any matters affecting international
peace and security to the court’s jurisdiction.26  Some countries have instead
supposed that the ICC and its Assembly of State Parties are entitled to mimic
Security Council authority, unilaterally impleading the nationals of states that
have declined to join the court.27  Washington sees this as a usurpation of the
Security Council’s established position in international law and in the architec-
22. See G.A. Res. 53/105, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/105 (Dec. 8, 1998); G.A. Res. 54/105,
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/105 (Dec. 9, 1999).  The PrepCom will continue to meet in two sessions
in 2001.  See G.A. Res. 55/155, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/155 (Dec. 12, 2000).
23. The missing partnership of the United States was noted by the General Assembly in the veiled
language of diplomacy.  The Assembly asked the PrepCom to “discuss ways to enhance the effective-
ness and acceptance of the Court.” See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. Res.
53/105, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/105, ¶ 4 (Jan. 26, 1999).  Accord Establishment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 54/105, 54th Sess., U.N.  Doc. A/RES/54/105, ¶ 3 (Jan. 25, 2000).
24. The language of the elements of crimes clarifies that overall military advantage must be consid-
ered in assessing the proportionality of military choices.  See Finalized draft text of the Elements of
Crimes, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
25. The Rome Treaty’s language going beyond the Fourth Geneva Convention in regulating the
transfer of populations was viewed by some as an attempt to castigate the West Bank settlements policy
of Israel.  The matter could have been an insurmountable obstacle to both American and Israel signa-
tures of the treaty.  It was resolved to Israel’s relative satisfaction in a compromise struck in spring
2000, at a time of optimism in the peace process.   In one of the arch rituals of diplomacy, the venue for
compromise was a bilateral meeting between the European countries and Arab states, from which the
United States and Israel were nominally excluded, while supporting the effort, compare Rome Statute,
supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(viii)(emphasis added)(defining as an international crime “The transfer, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of  parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within
or outside this territory.”) with Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, supra note 20, at 28 (re-
quired elements of proof include that the conduct  “took place in the context of and was associated with
an international armed conflict” and “[t[he term ‘transfer’ needs to be interpreted in  accordance with
the relevant  provisions of international humanitarian law”).  Israel signed the Rome treaty on Decem-
ber 31, 2000.
26. See Parts II and III of this article.
27. The Rome treaty provision in question is Article 12, grounding ICC jurisdiction upon the con-
sent of the state whose national is accused, or the state in whose territory an offense occurred.
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ture of the U.N. Charter.  Under the Charter, the permanent members of the
Security Council must concur in any U.N. enforcement decisions.  And in the
ordinary rules of treaty and customary law, a state cannot be bound without its
consent, except perhaps to norms of jus cogens.
Some enthusiasts have argued that ICC prosecution of the nationals of a
third-party state without Security Council concurrence does not amount to
binding a state to a treaty regime without its consent.  The individual and not
the state is the formal party, it is argued, and the state will not have any direct
duty of cooperation with the tribunal.  But where the charged conduct consists
of the faithful execution of official policy, the state remains a real party in inter-
est and the matter is closely akin to the jurisdictional prerequisite of an “indis-
pensable party.”28  In addition, the ICC’s prescribed deference to the investiga-
tive and prosecutorial decisions of national courts, under the doctrine of
“complementarity,”29 means practically speaking that the state of a third-party
national would be placed under extraordinary pressure to carry out its own in-
vestigation of his actions, even without joining the court, if the ICC provides no-
tice that it intends to proceed with an international criminal investigation.
To be sure, in the changing geometry of international criminal law, some
states have declared that their national courts are endowed with universal
criminal jurisdiction to try serious violations of humanitarian law, even without
any link of territory, nationality, or effect, and this may appear to resemble ICC
jurisdiction over third parties.  But the limits of this national jurisdiction are
contentious as well, recently challenged before the International Court of Jus-
tice by the Democratic Republic of the Congo.30  Claims over non-nationals are
most reliably based on a treaty agreement between the affected states.31  There
is no ordinary precedent for delegating national criminal jurisdiction to another
28. Compare East Timor (Port. v. Aust1.), [1995] I.C.J. Reports 90 (June 30, 1995).
29. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17-19.
30. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Order Rejecting Request of Congo for Provisional Measures and Rejecting Request of Bel-
gium for Removal of Case from List, International Court of Justice, Dec. 8, 2000; see also id., dissenting
opinion of Judge M. Francisco Rezek, ¶¶ 3, 6 (“C’est la première fois qu’un Etat s’adresse à la Cour
pour dire qu’un membre de son gouvernement fait l’objet d’un mandat d’arrêt délivré par une juridic-
tion d’un autre Etat, et que le gouvernement de ce dernier apporte un soutien à ce mandat d’arrêt en le
faisant parvenir à l’ensemble de la communauté internationale. … [une] question juridique dont
l’importance et l’actualité sont incontestables. ”); dissenting opinion of Judge Bula-Bula ¶ 20 (Imagi-
nons la situation inverse où des juges congolais émettraient des mandats similaires contre des organes
belges pour des faits commis au Congo postérieurement à Nuremberg, période de l’apparition de ce
nouveau droit selon le conseil belge.  Car, assure Antonio Cassese, la colonisation européenne a causé
<la destruction d’ethnie entières>”); and declaration of Judge Van den Wyngaert ¶ 3 (“important ques-
tion … how far States are allowed (or are obliged) to go when implementing and enforcing norms of
international criminal law”).
31. For example, the ultimate decision of the Law Lords in the Pinochet matter was founded on
the Convention on Torture, acceded to by Chile, the United Kingdom, and Spain.  See Ruth Wedg-
wood, Augusto Pinochet and International Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 241 (2000), and National Courts and
the Prosecution of War Crimes, in 1 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 393 (Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000).
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tribunal, international or national, without the consent of the affected states,
except in the aftermath of international belligerency.32
With America’s forward military posture in the world, Washington wants a
guarantee that its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will not be subject to the
ICC’s criminal jurisdiction unless and until the United States decides to join the
court as a full treaty party.  Despite the appointment of a conference facilita-
tor—experienced Chilean diplomat Cristian Maquieira—to serve as a mediator
in the efforts, the attempt to accommodate U.S. concerns has not yet been suc-
cessful.
Part of this failure stemmed from a structural problem in U.S. negotiating
techniques—the initial reluctance of the United States to decide its bottom line
on treaty issues until the Rome negotiations were too far along.33  Though
American military leaders, including former Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, asked for “100 percent” protection of their personnel against the exer-
cise of the court’s power—a demand made before the Rome conference by
Senator Helms34—it was sometimes difficult to value treaty procedures in “per-
centage” terms.  The 1998 Rome conference also presented a difficult setting
for effective negotiations.  The intricate treaty text was never voted on article
by article; instead, a conference chairman’s “package” was presented as an
unamendable text on the last day of a harried five-week session, leaving the
United States without time for inter-agency review or consultation with its al-
lies.35  The American attempt to gain consideration for a safe harbor or “look-
over” period was routed at Rome by a contest for rectitude among “like-
minded” states and non-governmental supporters.  To make an exclusion ac-
ceptable to other countries, after the treaty text was finalized at Rome, and
32. Compare Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States,
64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 13, pt. III (Winter 2001).  Critics of the contemporary
American position may be interested to compare the objections of former U.S. Secretary of State Rob-
ert Lansing and former U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser James Brown Scott to the post-World
War I proposal to try the Kaiser in an international tribunal.  See Commission on Responsibility of the
Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer-
ence, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (1920); Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the
United States, annexed to id., 14 AM. J. INT’L L. at 127.  In one of history’s ironic turns, the Dutch gov-
ernment at that time refused to extradite the Kaiser to stand trial before the Allies because it was
deemed inconsistent with Holland’s historic role as a “land of refuge for the vanquished in international
conflicts” and because the proposed charges were not part of Dutch law.  See JAMES F. WILLIS,
PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 98-112 (1982) (quoting Dutch diplomatic note of Jan. 23, 1920); AMRY
VENDENBOSCH, THE NEUTRALITY OF THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE WORLD WAR 183-84 (1927).
33. See Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome, 77(6) FOREIGN AFF. 20 (Nov./Dec. 1998); Ruth
Wedgwood, Courting Disaster: The U.S. Takes a Stand, 77(3) FOREIGN SERV. J. 34 (March 2000).
34. See Letter of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (Mar. 26, 1998)(“Recent reports indicated that the United States
now seems willing to accept a ‘compromise’ in which the power to grant jurisdiction would be taken out
of the jurisdiction of the Security Council.  Under this scenario, an American citizen could very well
come under the jurisdiction of a U.N. criminal court, even over the express objection of the United
States Government. . . . A treaty establishing such a court without a clear U.S. veto . . . will be dead-on-
arrival at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” (underlining in original)).
35. See Wedgwood, Courting Disaster: The U.S. Takes a Stand, supra note 33.
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permit some limitation of third-party jurisdiction, may require that the protec-
tions be stated with indirection.
There have been several attempts at finding a venue for compromise, which
are worth reexamining.
A. Article 12 and Jurisdiction
In early PrepCom negotiations in 1999, American diplomats tried to craft a
compromise to protect American personnel through a gloss of the jurisdictional
provision that purports to create third-party jurisdiction in the first place.36  Ar-
ticle 12(3) of the Rome Treaty permits non-party states to accede to the ICC
statute for one matter only.  It sets as a jurisdictional prerequisite ad hoc con-
sent by the state where the offense took place or the state of the offender’s na-
tionality.  An American request to change “or” to “and” was rejected on the
last night of treaty negotiations at Rome in July 1998, when the conference “bu-
reau” decided the political center of gravity lay elsewhere.  In the 1999 Prep-
Coms, the renewed American proposal was to gloss Article 12 to exempt “offi-
cial acts” from such third-party jurisdiction.  Though Article 12’s language
might initially seem more expansive, the United States can point to the palpable
self-contradiction of the treaty text itself, namely the stark inconsistency be-
tween Articles 11 and 12.  In Article 11(2), the Rome treaty sets a strict limit on
jurisdiction ratione temporis—the temporal competence of the ICC is as a court
designed to operate only on future crimes.  Under Article 11(2), if a state joins
the ICC after the Rome treaty has entered into force generally, “the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into
force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration [ac-
cepting ad hoc jurisdiction] under Article 12, paragraph 3.”37  It is hard to recon-
cile this strict temporal limitation on the ICC’s jurisdiction with a reading of Ar-
ticle 12 that permits a free-ranging selection of cases even before a third-party
state joins.  The PrepCom caucus of  “like-minded” states has attempted to ar-
gue, as noted above, that there is no real third-party effect in the treaty, because
before a state joins, it does not have to cooperate with the court even where its
nationals might be subject to ICC jurisdiction. But this distinction between
states and nationals cannot be reconciled with the plain and simple language of
treaty article 11—which limits the ICC’s own  “exercise of jurisdiction” with re-
spect to earlier crimes, rather than merely limiting a duty of state cooperation.
Nonetheless, the proposal concerning Article 12 did not appear acceptable to
many of America’s interlocutors, and was not formally taken up.38
36. See generally Ambassador David Scheffer, International Criminal Court: The Challenge of Ju-
risdiction, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 26,
1999).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
38. One safeguard against opportunistic use of Article 12(3) was adopted by the PrepCom in the
rules of procedure.  A non-party state agreeing to the ad hoc exercise of ICC jurisdiction on a particular
matter must be willing to accept symmetric application of ICC jurisdiction concerning its own actions.
Saddam Hussein could not question Allied military action against him without submitting his own con-
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B. Complementarity and Article 17
A chilly reception was also given by the like-minded states and NGO’s to an
alternative American draft rule at the December 1999 PrepCom concerning Ar-
ticle 17 and standards for admissibility.  This rule concerned complementarity—
the principle that the ICC should take a case only where national court systems
are “unwilling or unable genuinely” to carry out an investigation or prosecu-
tion. The American proposal would have set out several principles for consid-
eration (without dictating the outcome), when complementarity is considered.
In particular, the court would have to “take into account” that a state attests the
suspect was “acting in the course of his or her official duties authorized by [a]
State”—so long as the state also undertook to “immediately investigate pursu-
ant to its processes.”39  The rationale was that few states would be willing to ad-
mit their authorization of a defendant’s activities in case of horrific mistreat-
ment of, say, a civilian population.  The exemption for “official duties” would
thus be self-limiting.  However, this proffer was also rebuffed, and not further
considered.
duct in the war to the court’s jurisdiction.  Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3) (non-party
State “may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
with respect to the crime in question”)(emphasis added), with Finalized draft text of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, supra note 20, Rule 44 (When a non-party State acts under article 12(3), “the Reg-
istrar shall inform the State concerned that the declaration under article 12, paragraph 3, has as a con-
sequence the acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 of relevance to the
situation [including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes].”).  See also Ruth Wedgwood,
The United States and the International Criminal Court: Achieving a Wider Consensus Through the
“Ithaca Package,” 32 CORN. INT’L L.J. 535, 541 (1999)(“A sensible reading of Article 12(3) will help
parry misuse of the Court’s jurisdiction.  If a non-party State agrees to ad hoc ICC jurisdiction ‘with re-
spect to the crime in question,’ the State must be willing to have its own conduct scrutinized as well.”).
39. Proposal submitted by the United States of America concerning articles 17, 18 and 19 of Part 2 of
the Rome Statute, concerning jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law, Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/WGRPE/DP.45 (Dec. 2, 1999).  The proposed Rule for article 17(1)(a) read as follows:
In determining, under article 17(1)(a) or (b) or (c), whether a case is inadmissible, the
Court shall take into account, inter alia, the following:
• The independence of the State’s applicable justice system, including its court martial
system;
• Whether in the past the State has genuinely investigated or prosecuted similar con-
duct, whether official or non-official, by its military personnel or citizens; and
• Whether the State has communicated in writing to the Office of the Prosecutor that
the person concerned was acting in the course of his or her official duties authorized
by such State with respect to the matter under investigation and that the State shall
immediately investigate pursuant to its processes, or has investigated or shall con-
tinue to investigate, fully such person’s actions and, if warranted, shall prosecute ex-
peditiously such person for any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
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III
RECENT PROPOSALS
A. Article 98(2) and the Relationship Agreement
The venue for a possible compromise has now moved to the obscurity of the
treaty’s closing sections—a coda that contains other efforts at accommodation,
including a seven-year transition provision added at French insistence in the last
moments of the Rome conference.40  The third major American proposal builds
on Article 98(2) and has traveled a considerable distance from the original U.S.
demand, in a broad concession virtually unacknowledged by America’s allies.
This American proposal was framed in a “non-paper” circulated at the
March 2000 PrepCom, after full clearance by the interagency process that per-
mits comment by interested Executive Branch departments and agencies in
Washington.  The proposal does not ask for any halter on the ICC’s ability to
investigate or even to frame charges against the nationals of third-party coun-
tries.  Rather, the ICC would be limited only in seeking the actual surrender of
or accepting physical custody of a third-party defendant for official acts, where
the accused’s government has not given consent following the investigation and
the Security Council has not authorized the action.  This proposal would enable
the ICC to inquire into and even to charge any crime defined by the Rome stat-
ute, consistent with the requirements of complementarity and deference to the
work of national courts.
 If an ICC criminal investigation were opened scrutinizing official acts and
yielded persuasive results, the cumulative evidence would raise the political cost
of refusing voluntary surrender of the defendant.  (Some ICC proponents seem
to have surprisingly little faith in the ICC’s prestige.)  The ICC’s investigative
jurisdiction would give national military authorities a strong incentive to inves-
tigate allegations thoroughly through their own means as well.  In the U.S.
compromise proposal implementing the Rome treaty, the ICC’s champions
would gain “truth commission” capability and more, even over non-party states,
limited only in the ability to seek arrest without state waiver.  The acts of third-
party nationals are thus most decidedly not immunized from international scru-
40. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124 (permitting a seven-year transition period for the ac-
ceptance of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes committed by a party’s nationals or on its territory), and
Interpretive Declaration of France,June 9, 2000, under article 124, available in Ratification Status of
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court <www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.  French
NGOs have criticized Paris’s reliance on the seven-year transition of Article 124.  See Press Release,
French Coalition for the International Criminal Court, France must ratify the statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court without restriction (Mar. 2000)(released at the March 200 PrepCom).  France is
said to have worried that it “could be the target of ‘unfounded complaints tainted with hidden political
motives’” because it was “engaged in numerous external theatres, notably in connection with peace-
keeping operations.”  Id.  The French government’s calculation, said the French NGO coalition,  was
that the seven-year delay would “enable the effectiveness of the guarantees incorporated in the Statute
to be verified, in order to prevent abusive actions”—an argument they deemed “inadmissible.” Id.  The
Rome treaty conference bureau responded affirmatively to the French government’s concerns.
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tiny.  The ICC’s investigative work (if persuasive) would be bolstered by public
opinion and discussion.
1. Article 98.  The modality of this American proposal is Article 98 of the
Rome Treaty.  The proposal has two parts—a new rule under Article 98, and
then a “relationship agreement” between the ICC and the United Nations.
The text of Article 98 explicitly limits surrenders by requiring the ICC to re-
spect the international obligations of states—including the rules of diplomatic
immunity, “State immunity” (in particular, head-of-state immunity), military
status of forces agreements (“SOFAs”), and extradition agreements.41  Thus,
some defendants are already protected from arrest under the plain text of the
Rome statute—even when their own state has joined the treaty as a full party—
unless their government specifically agrees to waive the immunity.
The American proposal suggested an analogous rule under Article 98, clari-
fying  the court’s competence to accept surrenders or take custody over defen-
dants as provided by the ICC’s relationship agreement with the United Nations.
The Article 98 rule would require arrests to conform to any agreements entered
into by the ICC itself (as a body with independent international personality).
As originally proposed by the United States, the draft rule read as follows: “The
Court shall proceed with a request for surrender or an acceptance of a person
into the custody of the Court only in a manner consistent with its obligations
under the relevant international agreement.”42
As noted, the text of Article 98 already subordinates the ICC’s power to ask
for arrests to the binding force of other state-to-state obligations.  The Court
cannot ask treaty states to arrest or surrender foreign suspects where that action
would be inconsistent with existing treaties or understandings.  No state will be
asked to violate the absolute immunity from arrest of diplomats and visiting
heads of state, or the qualified immunity of military personnel under status of
forces agreements.  This does not immunize the underlying acts (immunity ex
materiae) but rather safeguards the person of an individual while he retains a
certain status (immunity ex personae).43  The new American proposal builds on
41. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98:
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would re-
quire the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law
with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State,
unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the
immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the re-
quested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State
for the giving of consent for the surrender.
42. See Proposed Text of Rule to article 98 of the Rome Treaty (Non-Paper of the United States,
Mar. 2000).
43. A comparable distinction may be implicit even in the Statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1994
(1993).  Article 7(2) of the ICTY statute provides that “[t]he official position of any accused person,
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this protection of state immunities by recognizing the capacity of the court to
enter its own binding agreements, including agreements limiting the right to
seek surrenders.
2. The Relationship Agreement.  The shape of the elephant hiding in the
garden is revealed by the second step—the proposed text for an Article 98
agreement between the United Nations and the ICC.  A “relationship”
agreement between the court and the United Nations is called for in the original
Rome treaty.44  The ICC is a separate legal entity from the United Nations,45
even though a portion of the court’s funding may come from the General
Assembly46—hence the court needs an agreement to define its working
relationship with the United Nations.  The U.N. General Assembly asked the
PrepCom to attempt to address U.S. concerns with the ICC, and, perhaps not
coincidentally, Ambassador Cristian Maquieira of Chile was named by the
PrepCom chairman, Ambassador Philippe Kirsch, as the “contact point for the
draft texts of a relationship agreement between the [ICC] and the United
Nations” and, as well, the contact to address “the request contained in
paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 53/105.”47  This opaque phrase was
a discreet reference to the attempt to address U.S. concerns.48
U.S. negotiators have conceded that the particular form of the jurisdictional
rule is not essential—the guarantee could also take the form of a “protocol . . .
or perhaps some other side agreement that would be binding on the ICC and its
judges.”49  But the proposed modality for the safeguard—including a proviso on
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”  The ultimate criminal responsibility of an
official for acts that exceed any permissible conception of his duties (ratione materiae) does not itself
resolve the question of personal immunity from arrest (ratione personae) in a limited set of conditions,
for example, while he is a sitting head of state. The recent dismissal from office of President Slobodan
Milosevic of Yugoslavia avoids the question of whether the Hague Tribunal indictment itself could
authorize the arrest of a sitting head of state.  But one might ask how the English Law Lords would
have ruled if General Pinochet remained as a sitting head of state.  Compare Memorandum of [U.S.]
Reservations, supra note 32, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. at 136, 148-49.
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2 (“The Court shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties and thereafter
concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.”).  The 1998 Rome conference directed the
PrepCom to prepare a relationship agreement.  See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence, supra note 4, Annex I, Res. F ¶ 5(c).
45. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (“The Court shall have international legal personality.
It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the ful-
fillment of its purposes.”).
46. Id. art. 115(b).
47. See Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its first, second, and third sessions, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1, ¶ 12 (Dec. 1999).
48. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 23; Press Release, United Na-
tions, Legal Committee Reviews Progress Made in Setting Up World Criminal Court; Speakers Urge
Against Altering Rome Statute in Quest for Universality, U.N. GA/L/3114 (Oct. 20, 1999).
49. Talking points of the United States, March 2000.  The talking points were in general circulation
among NGOs at the March 2000 PrepCom.  Another strategy (not adopted by the United States, but
suggested early on by a conference official) might contemplate an American agreement to cooperate
with the tribunal, adding conditions to that agreement limiting the court’s domain over non-party na-
tionals.  An evident problem with this option, however, is a reluctant chicken and unavailable egg—the
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arrests and surrenders in an Article 98 relationship agreement between the
United Nations and the ICC—was circulated informally at the March 2000
PrepCom,50 though it was not formally introduced.51  It would clarify the ICC’s
personal jurisdiction over third-party nationals where two conditions are met.
First, if a U.N. member state has not yet ratified the treaty, the ICC could not
arrest or take custody of an accused for acts “within [the member state’s] over-
all direction,” as long as the state has acknowledged its role.  Second, the state’s
officials and agents could still be detained where the non-party state provides
consent, or where the Security Council votes to make the criminal referral.52
The American proposal for a relationship agreement speaks of “overall di-
rection” rather than “official duties,” perhaps in a post-Pinochet attempt to
avoid controversy on what legitimately qualifies as an official duty.53  But the
political premise of the U.S. proposal is that the heinous offenses for which the
ICC was designed, such as genocide and systematic outrages against civilians,
are not likely to be openly embraced by governments as official policy or acts
under their direction.  Hence, the immunity’s practical reach would be limited
to military conduct within the range of reason.
U.S. Congress would surely dispute the competence of any American president to enter into a coopera-
tion agreement with the court through unilateral Executive action, and Congress in its current mood is
not likely to approve any promise of cooperation with the court.  Even if the president is constitution-
ally competent to enter into a limited cooperation agreement without congressional concurrence, the
political cost is likely to be unattractive.  Concededly, the president could not constitutionally authorize
the surrender of a defendant on his own authority.  See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
50. See Proposed Text to Supplemental Document to the Rome Treaty (Non-Paper of the United
States, Mar. 2000).
51. See Proposal submitted by the United States of America concerning rules and procedure and evi-
dence relating to Part 9 of the Statute (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGPRE(9)/DP.4, also reproduced in Bruce Zagaris, Prep Com to Finish Work on Pro-
cedure and Elements of Crime While Status of U.S. to the Court Undecided, 16 INT’L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. No. 7 (July 2000).
52. See Proposed Text, supra note 50:
The United Nations and the ICC agree that the Court may seek the surrender or accept cus-
tody of a national who acts within the overall direction of a U.N. Member State, and such di-
recting State has so acknowledged, only in the event (a) the directing State is a State Party to
the Statute or the Court obtains the consent of the directing State, or (b) measures have been
authorized pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against the directing State in relation
to the situation or actions giving rise to the alleged crime or crimes, provided that in connec-
tion with such authorization the Security Council has determined that this subsection shall ap-
ply.
Reproduced in Bruce Zagaris, Prep Com to Finish Work on Procedure and Elements of Crime While
Status of U.S. to the Court Undecided, 16 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. No. 7 (July 2000).
53. The Pinochet decisions of the Law Lords held that systematic torture could not qualify as offi-
cial acts, even for a former head of state.  See Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex
parte Pinochet, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) (Nov. 25, 1998)(Lord Slynn, Lord Lloyd, Lord Nicholls, Lord
Steyn & Lord Hoffman), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1302 [hereinafter Pinochet I], vacated by 2 W.L.R. 272
(H.L.) (Jan. 15, 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 430 [hereinafter Pinochet II] (on grounds of potential con-
flict of interest); Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, 2 W.L.R. 827
(H.L.) (Mar. 24, 1999) (Lord Browne-Wilkson, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Saville of
Newdigate, Lord Millett, and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in majority, and Lord Goff of Chiev-
eley in dissent), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 [hereinafter Pinochet III], aff’g and rev’g in part Pinochet I.
See generally Wedgwood, Augusto Pinochet and International Law, supra note 31 .
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3. Crabwise Walk.  The Article 98(2) proposal was floated at the March
2000 preparatory meeting in New York, and drew reflexive opposition from
some NGOs.54  The NGO coalition’s initial response, though not necessarily
definitive,55 appeared to miss the forest for the trees.  Without a word of
surprise, the NGO non-paper acknowledged that the U.S. proposal “means that
the Court would be able to exercise its jurisdiction up to the point of seeking
surrender.  Investigations will have been authorized under [Article] 15, will
have been conducted, arrest warrants and indictments may have been issued.”56
Though the issuance of an arrest warrant is inconsistent with the American
proposal, the earlier stages of the criminal process leave a wide swath for the
ICC in discharging a critical and didactic role, even over non-party nationals.
It is frankly surprising that the United States Executive was prepared to go
so far in limiting what the U.S. military might want for its protection.  The mili-
tary may enjoy “100 percent protection” against arrest, but there is no similar
guarantee against use of the court as a platform to critique U.S. or NATO mili-
tary policy.  In rejecting the extraordinary American concession, the NGOs and
like-minded states would be discarding the very court they profess to want.
The PrepCom approved the necessary underlying rule for this compromise
in June 2000, with the stringent caveat that it did not commit states parties to
accepting the second step of a proposed relationship agreement.  Rule 195(2) of
the proposed rules of procedure and evidence, benignly headed “Provision of
Information,” states that
[t]he court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person, without the
consent of a sending State, if, under article 98, paragraph 2, such a request would be
inconsistent with obligations under an international agreement pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required prior to the surrender of a person of that State
to the Court.57
In the arcanae of negotiated texts, the change of reference from a “requested
State” and “its obligations under international agreements” in Article 98(2) of
the Rome Statute, to a generic reference in Rule 195(2) to the consistency of
surrender with “obligations under an international agreement” (emphasis
added) was believed sufficient to provide the necessary room for further nego-
tiation of an ICC-United Nations relationship agreement to protect third-party
54. The attempt to gain a more soothing reception was hobbled (as seems the American habit) by
delay in preparing the diplomatic ground.  Approval of the proposal was reportedly reached within the
U.S. interagency process only one working day before the PrepCom opened in New York.  Diplomatic
notes were dispatched to national capitals, but the specialized personnel needed by each government to
answer questions about the court were already en route to the PrepCom.  Representatives of the like-
minded states and NGOs in the U.N. basement conference rooms thus were able to coordinate an in-
formal multilateral cold-shoulder.
55. Because many NGOs could not commit themselves to a view before the deliberations of their
boards of directors, the NGOs informally issued the equivalent of a diplomatic “non-paper.”  Points on
U.S. proposal on U.N./ICC relationship agreement (Mar. 2000)(circulated at March 2000 PrepCom).
56. Id.
57. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Final-
ized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 20, § V (Cooperation under article
98), Rule 195 (Provision of Information), ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
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nationals from arrest or involuntary surrender.  This understanding of the rule
is confirmed by the demurrers issued by some states upon its adoption, as well
as by the negative pregnant proviso incorporated in the Commission proceed-
ings—that “[i]t is generally understood that rule [195(2)] should not be inter-
preted as requiring or in any way calling for the negotiation of provisions in any
particular international agreement by the Court or by any other international
organization or State.”58
Despite predictions by some observers that the deadline of December 2000
was crucial for a compromise since the American presidency would change
hands, the third-round U.S. proposal found little reception among allies or the
caucus of like-minded states. In the absence of any visible support, the Ameri-
can negotiators held back on any formal introduction of language of the pro-
posed relationship agreement in the record of the 2000 PrepCom.  However,
the chairman of the PrepCom, Ambassador Philippe Kirsch, by leave of the
General Assembly, has extended the time for completion of the relationship
agreement, and this will permit future consideration.
B. Fourteen-year Transition Provision and Article 124
In the PrepCom of November-December 2000, one last pair of informal
proposals for compromise were discussed in the corridors.  The first was a pro-
posal by Switzerland that would build upon the architecture of the transition
provision permitted under Article 124.  As noted above, at the urging of France
in the 1998 Rome negotiations, the final treaty text included an “opt-out” clause
that permits a state party to exclude ICC jurisdiction over its nationals for “war
crimes” for a seven-year “transitional” period.  The conference chairman at
Rome declined a somewhat broader American proposal that would have al-
lowed a treaty party to exclude ICC jurisdiction over both war crimes and
crimes against humanity for a ten-year period. However, the Swiss floated a
proposal at the November-December 2000 PrepCom that built upon the fact
that Article 124 does not discuss the application of the opt-out to non-treaty
states.  The thought is to separate the status of signatory countries and full par-
ties.  Each would be permitted a separate seven-year transition provision al-
lowing an opt-out from war crimes jurisdiction. Thus a signatory state could
qualify for a seven-year exemption from war crimes jurisdiction commencing on
the date the treaty comes into effect, and an additional seven-year exemption
upon ratification.  This gives a more significant transitional period to resolve
American attitudes toward the court.  This fourteen-year limit on war crimes ju-
risdiction was discussed in the caucus of like-minded states, and encountered
some initial opposition but may well be revived.
A final compromise proposal offered informally at the November-
December 2000 PrepCom would tighten the procedures for determining admis-
58. See  Press Release, United Nations, Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court
Adopts Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Text on Elements of Crimes, U.N. GA/L/2963 (June 30,
2000).
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sibility. In particular, under the Rome treaty, states parties and non-parties
alike can challenge a proposed ICC investigation as inconsistent with the ICC
duty to defer to national court proceedings—so-called complementarity.59 In
addition, the court can review the admissibility of an investigation on its own
motion, including issues of complementarity.60  The compromise proposal would
permit a challenge to be brought before the Pretrial Chamber upon the opening
of an investigation, and to be renewed or initiated upon any actual arrest of a
defendant,61 at least in cases concerning actions outside a state’s own territory.
This too was not formally offered in the record of the PrepCom and may be
considered further in 2001.
IV
ON AGGRESSION (TEN YEARS EARLY)
It is worth noting that the need felt by the United States for legal protection,
while it remains a non-party, has only been heightened by the PrepCom’s on-
going discussions about the possible crime of “aggression.”62  This jurisdictional
category was added to the Rome treaty text with the strong support of Ger-
many and Arab states,63 but there was no agreement at Rome on how to distin-
guish aggression from the legitimate exercise of military power.  The category
was left outside the operational span of the court until a definition could be set-
tled at the first review conference of the ICC, almost a decade from now.64
During the Rome negotiations, senior conference officials offered the pri-
vate assurance that consensus on the definition of aggression was unlikely to be
reached even at the first review conference. In any event, treaty parties dis-
senting from a proposed definition of aggression would apparently be exempt
from the jurisdictional power of the court in applying this category of offense.65
But no such exemption from a controverted definition of aggression has been
explicitly accorded to non-parties, and recent PrepComs have seen an eager
59. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17-19, 82(1) & 82(2).
60. See id. art. 19(1).
61. Authority for this renewed examination includes Article 19(1), first sentence, which requires
that the court “shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it” (applicable if ad-
missibility is deemed jurisdictional), and Article 19(1), second sentence, which allows the court to de-
termine admissibility on its own motion.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(d).
63. See generally Herman von Hebel & Daryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 81-85 (Roy
Lee ed., 1999).
64. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2) (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and
setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”).
Articles 121 and 123 permit a treaty amendment defining “aggression” to be considered at a review
conference seven years after the Rome Treaty enters into force.  Id. arts. 121, 123.  Entry into force re-
quires ratification by sixty countries.  Id. art. 126.  As of December 31, 2000, twenty-seven countries had
ratified the statute and one hundred thirty-nine countries had signed.  See Rome Statute Signature and
Ratification Chart <http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html>.
65. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
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discussion, in closed sessions, by states seeking to operationalize a crime of “ag-
gressive war.”
To be sure, aggression was charged at Nuremberg, and American prosecu-
tors took the lead in convicting German leaders who planned and executed the
Third Reich’s invasion of Poland, Belgium, France, and other victim states.66
But the Allied prosecutors at the time acknowledged that the German war for
“lebensraum” provided an unusually clear case.67  Today, what constitutes “ag-
gression” in other less malign circumstances is problematic, and many interna-
tional rules on the legitimate use of force are disputed.
The U.N. Charter of 1945 delegates to the Security Council the primary re-
sponsibility to assess threats to international peace and security.68  The Charter
also recognizes an inherent right of self-defense that belongs to states and col-
lective groups of states, at least in response to an “armed attack” (or “agression
armée” in the French text).69  In a world of real dangers, the Council often
doesn’t function as the U.N. founders supposed it would.  Countries face un-
charted questions concerning the limits of anticipatory self-defense (acting be-
fore an adversary can invade or mobilize), counter-measures against hostile acts
of force,70 as well as the right of humanitarian action.
Kosovo provides a cautionary tale.  NATO’s military campaign against Bel-
grade in 1999 did not fit within the traditional paradigm of the U.N. Charter—
despite its morally compelling aim to stop ethnic cleansing.  Secretary-General
Kofi Annan has sketched the dilemma: Security Council authority must be re-
spected, but where the Council is stymied, notes Mr. Annan, a forcible response
may be demanded nonetheless to counter humanitarian outrages such as ethnic
cleansing or genocide.  Inaction may be too high a price for procedural perfec-
66. See generally SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR (1946).
67. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg,
noted in a foreword to Professor Glueck’s book, the signal difficulties of defining aggression in less ex-
treme circumstances.
In the evolution of the law that it is a criminal offense to plan, incite, or wage a war of aggres-
sion … [t]here are many theoretical difficulties which cause violent debate but which do not
plague us practically in the Nürnberg case at all. These questions might cause considerable
trouble in other circumstances.  But the evidence at Nürnberg has shown that in this war an
aggressive intention was declared by the Nazis—secretly of course—from the very beginning;
an intention to get their neighbors’ lands without the incumbrance of the neighbors. . . . In not
one of these invasions is it claimed that Germany was actually attacked first, or that any one
of these countries, with the possible exception of Russia, had the forces to make attack on
Germany a serious threat . . . the result is that by any possible definition of aggression, this
war was aggressive in its plotting and execution.
Foreword in id., at viii-ix.
68. U.N. Charter art. 39.
69. Id. art. 51.
70. In the Nicaragua case, for example, the International Court of Justice denied the right of the
United States to use forcible countermeasures against a country allegedly providing sanctuary, funding,
and logistical support to cross-border insurgents, holding that this staging did not qualify as an “armed
attack” eligible for collective self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
[1986] I.C.J. Reports 14 (June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986).
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tionism, at least in extreme circumstances.71  In Kosovo, as surely as in Rwanda,
the values of the U.N. Charter were at risk because of the failure of U.N. pro-
cedures.72
To be sure, NATO’s military action in Kosovo found substantial legal com-
fort from a number of circumstances.73  The Security Council recognized the ex-
istence of a threat to international peace and security in Kosovo, and voted
down by a large margin the draft Russian resolution condemning the NATO
campaign.74  Security Council resolution 1244 after the conflict authorized a
U.N. administration and international military presence to consolidate
Kosovo’s “substantial autonomy”75—adopting the results of the NATO effort.
NATO’s multilateral action may be likened to the changed role of regional or-
ganizations under Chapter VIII, where the Council has acted after the fact to
approve previous regional enforcement action.76  But the argument for the le-
gitimacy of NATO’s action does not follow traditional legal blueprints.
“Emerging” legal principles (lege feranda) give little comfort to military leaders
against a roving international prosecutor.77
71. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General As-
sembly, UN SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999):
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in
the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask — not in the context of Kosovo—
but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a
coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not re-
ceive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the
horror to unfold?
72. Richard Holbrooke’s parting statement to his colleagues on the Security Council, in a some-
what different context, may be apropos. “[F]lexibility [] in which we put outcome ahead of process is
important,” he said.  “My greatest criticism of this institution, really, is about the dominance of process
over outcome.”  Statement of Richard Holbrooke before the U.N. Security Council, Jan. 19, 2001, UN
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4259, at 14 (Jan. 19, 2001).
73. See generally Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 828 (Oct.
1999), and Unilateral Action in the U.N. System, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 349 (2000). Compare Alain
Pellet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 385 (2000).
74. Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26,
1999), reprinted in Press Release, United Nations, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of
Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999) (3-12 vote).
75. U.N. SCOR Res. 1244, S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999.
76. See Statement of Ambassador Danilo Turk, Permanent Representative of Slovenia, in Press
Release, supra note 74 (“[T]he Council had chosen to remain silent at times when regional organiza-
tions sought to remove regional threats to peace and security. . . . According to the United Nations
Charter, the Security Council had the primary, but not exclusive responsibility for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security.”).  But compare Press Release, United Nations, Transcript of Press Confer-
ence by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at Headquarters, U.N. SG/SM/7668 (Dec. 20, 2000) (Press
Question: “[I]s there not also a danger of competition, . . . when regional groups like the upcoming
European Union rapid deployment force or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do their
own thing, as in Kosovo?”  The Secretary-General: “I do not see competition. Even our own Charter
foresees a role for regional organizations. . . . I really do not believe that after what we went through
with Kosovo we are going to see too many Kosovos tomorrow. I suspect that in the future regional or-
ganizations will approach the Security Council before they move forward.”).
77. In the recent filing by Yugoslavia against NATO countries in the half-century-old International
Court of Justice, the Court’s dismissal of the civil complaint against the United States and most claims
against the United Kingdom on jurisdictional grounds was accompanied by the striking aperçu of Act-
ing President Christopher Weeramantry announcing that the “use of force in Yugoslavia” presented
“very serious issues of international law,” causing concern throughout NATO’s SHAPE headquarters.
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The United States has every reason to be protective of the role of the Secu-
rity Council in determining the existence of threats to peace and security.  Yet
the need to respond to unprecedented emergencies under changing principles
of law may warrant concern about the reviewing power of a new judicial body,
especially one that strays beyond the task of looking for humanitarian outrages.
Nor would the Security Council retain the last word in findings of aggres-
sion.  Under the proposals floated at the December 1999 PrepCom,78 the ICC
prosecutor need not wait for Council action before bringing a criminal charge of
aggression.  The Council would be referred any allegation of aggression, but if
the Council failed to act within six or twelve months, the ICC could begin a case
anyway.  In one proposal, the prosecutor and ICC could proceed immediately.79
In another, the General Assembly would first be asked to take the Council’s
place in finding or dismissing the allegation of aggression.80  If the General As-
sembly also failed to act, the ICC could make the extraordinary judgment of
what constitutes aggression.81  This wide array of proposals  remains on the table
following the November-December 2000 PrepCom.82
A finding by the Security Council requires the concurrence of the five per-
manent members.83  To obtain an affirmative finding that no aggression has oc-
curred, the U.S. would have to subject its military actions to the approval of
Russia, China, and France—not an easy prospect in the real world.  Nonperma-
nent members could also block the necessary three-fifths majority required for
a finding.
A prosecutor trained in the precepts of international humanitarian law (jus
in bello) is not the obvious authority to judge the legitimacy of using force in
protection of community safety and common values.84  Current disputes over
Security Council reform are an inadequate reason for overturning the role of
See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), [1999] I.C.J. Reports ¶ 16 (June 2), reprinted in 38
I.L.M. 1188, 1193 (1999); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), [1999] I.C.J. Reports ¶ 16 (June 2),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1167, 1172 (1999).  See also the proposal of 15 Arab states that aggression should
be defined broadly to include “depriv[ing] other peoples of their rights to self-determination, freedom
or independence.”  Proposal submitted by Algeria, et al., Article 5, Crimes within the jurisdiction of the
court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/C.1/L.37 (July 1, 1998).
78. Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, Consolidated text of proposals on the crime of
aggression, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGCA/RT.1, at 3-5 (Dec. 9, 1999)(conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction).
79. Id. at 3-4 (option 1, variation 1).
80. Id. at 3 (option 1, variation 2).
81. Id.
82. See Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its sixth session (Nov. 27-Dec. 8, 2000), U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1 (Dec. 14, 2000), Annex V (Crimes of Aggression).
83. U.N. Charter art. 27.
84. Cf. Statement of the United States on the Crime of Aggression, Dec. 6, 1999 (“The fact that the
Security Council does not determine that aggression in a particular situation has occurred can be as sig-
nificant, as a matter of law and political reality, as a decision that aggression has occurred. . . . It may be
frustrating that the Council has not acted, but that frustration does not create the jurisdiction for the
Court that some may seek.”).
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the Council in U.N. architecture—and doing so by an irregular process that ig-
nores Charter amendment rules.85
V
CONCLUSION
More than one cynic has suggested that some countries may actually prefer
that the United States not join the court—so that the tribunal could be seen as a
test of Europe going it alone.  Europe does enjoy a new independence.  The
Cold War is over, and Lord Ismay’s triple task for the North Atlantic alliance
seems remote.  The Rome conference was at the hub of an unusual political
weather pattern, with new NGO competence, like-minded states in Europe an-
nouncing an “ethical foreign policy,” and post-Maastricht Europe searching for
a common foreign and security policy.86  Hostility toward the Security Council
and the veto power of its permanent members added to the brew.87
With the close of the Cold War, some political leaders in Europe and else-
where have felt a heady independence, doubtful that U.S. power remains cru-
cial in global security tasks.  Deterring regional bullies and terrorist groups is
seen by some as insufficient reason to accommodate American military needs,
even with the tensions remaining between India and Pakistan, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.  But a disdain for American
power will have wide-ranging consequences.  In peace enforcement operations,
whether in the Persian Gulf or Kosovo, the traditional U.S. tasks of airlift, logis-
tics, intelligence, and air power cannot be delegated to countries that lack ca-
pacity.  A new generation of smart weapons has not been purchased by Europe,
and no country matches U.S. naval capacity.  Even in regional peacekeeping, as
in East Timor, a successful operation often depends on U.S. materiel and dip-
lomatic support.
In peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism, the United
States will continue to play a flagship role.  There are other new threats to the
peace as well, including the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons.  It would be a pity to allow misjudgment of the long-term security en-
vironment to generate a disregard for the constructive tasks of American mili-
tary power, and fatally hobble shared support for an effective criminal tribunal.
American Senators and military leaders—and the American public—will want
to see how the court works in practice before considering the possibility of full
ratification and formal membership.  If this “look-over” period is not safe, the
advocates seeking a “war on the court” may win the day.
Where to go from here is unclear.  The ICC may seek to gain the confidence
of responsible national militaries by involving them in the process of investi-
85. U. N. Charter art. 108.
86. See Wedgwood, Courting Disaster, supra note 33.
87. Id.  Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s announcement that the United States may agree to a
significantly enlarged Council may lessen this wellspring of resistance.  See Barbara Crossette, U.S.
Ready for Much Larger Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at A4.
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gating and prosecuting humanitarian law violations.  The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has felt a practical dependence upon
NATO—for example, the court needs military security for its investigations in
hostile areas of former conflict.  The ICC’s interplay with legitimate militaries
should be intellectual as well.  Operationalizing ideas such as “proportionality”
requires hard judgments about military tactics and alternative ways of con-
ducting a military operation.  Civilian judges of any stripe (national or interna-
tional) may not be equipped without expert assistance to evaluate battlefield
decisions—for example, a decision on military necessity often depends on the
nature of the battle plan and practical alternatives.  This gap in understanding
can be mitigated by involving NATO and other responsible militaries in the
court’s practical operations: on a military advisory council, on rosters of expert
witnesses, or (for retired or seconded personnel) even as military law clerks.
The ICC cannot afford to be an institution opposed to the legitimate use of
force in the protection of global security.  ICC judges and prosecutors will be
selected for their expertise in criminal law and international law.88  They should
also recognize that there is expert military knowledge and judgment to which
they may occasionally need to defer, and certainly of which they must have an
understanding.
In the present moment, it is the question of third-party status that will de-
termine whether the United States remains supportive of the court.  Third-party
coverage was not contemplated in the International Law Commission draft for
the ICC in 1994, or through most of the four years of preparatory meetings that
preceded the Rome negotiations.  Its sudden emergence just before the end
substantially changed the parameters of the debate.  Whatever the limits of in-
ternational law, the original impetus of the Rome treaty was to build a perma-
nent court on the solid principle of state consent. 
The ability of the United States to have a “safe zone” while it watches the
court in operation is key to gaining confidence in the new institution.  A transi-
tion period will be central to a renewed alliance.  The rebuff of earlier Ameri-
can proposals has left some European friends supposing that another palliative
will have to be offered by the like-minded—that the United States may live with
a measure that does not go quite so far as its own proposals.  Our Rome inter-
locutors are bound to realize, however, that the issue of third-party jurisdiction
goes to the heart of the debate over American security policy.  The worthy aims
of the International Criminal Court will not justify unworkable constraints on
the exercise of the American security role in the common interest.
88. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 36(3)(b), 42(3).
